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Abstract
Budgetary consolidations are considered the obvious explanation for the decline in public 
investment that most Western European countries experienced over the past three decades.
However, regressions based on budgetary variables tend to overpredict public investment 
during the post 1990-period, i.e., when the budgetary stress eased.
We supplement the budgetary consolidation approach to public investment with ideas 
from behavioural economics to explain why these investments do not increase when 
additional budgetary resources are available. We use the peak/end evaluation procedure to 
capture the frustration of voters as cuts in government consumption expenditures accumulate.
This ‘memory-effect’ of budgetary consolidations implies that voters recall the previous peak 
government consumption expenditures. They remain discontent as long as current 
expenditures are below the peak value. When the budgetary situation improves, policy makers 
will choose to increase government consumption because this is electorally more rewarding.
Public investment will thus decline when budgetary consolidations are imposed and will 
remain constant when additional budgetary resources emerge. 
We test for a memory-effect by introducing expenditure gaps in public investment 
regressions. These gaps equal the difference between the highest previously observed primary 
government consumption to GDP ratio and the current ratio. The regression results for most 
EU-countries support ou r assumption. 
Page 1 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2
I. Introduction
Public investment declined sharply over the past three decades in many Western European 
countries. Noteworthy exceptions are the Mediterranean countries Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. Following the pioneering studies of Aschauer (1989a and 1989b) on the productivity of 
public investment, economists studied quite intensively the consequences of this decline1. 
Only a few studies focus on the explanations for the lower level of public investment. These 
are most of the time inspired by studies on fiscal consolidations (see Giudice, Turrini and in ‘t 
Veld, 2003, p. 7 for a survey of fiscal consolidation studies). The main conclusion of this 
research is that public investment suffered from the budgetary consolidation processes that
many countries had to impose to avoid a further deterioration of their public finances.
Econometric studies on public investment thus incorporate variables that capture the financial 
stress of government budgets.
Public investment has never been a ‘popular’ policy or research item. The policy neglect 
of public investment is easily explained from a budgetary point of view: public investment
was never and is certainly not today an important budgetary item. The recent academic 
disregard of public investment accords, however, with earlier experiences. Indeed, skipping 
through surveys of the literature on the growth of government expenditures2 one does not find 
many references to public investment. One obvious explanation is that public investment wa s 
never an important determinant of the growth of government expenditures. 
The literature on the impact of consolidations on public investment looks at how policy 
makers can limit the electoral damage from budgetary consolidations required by the 
precarious state of public finances.  The large drop in public investment in the seventies and 
eighties is straightforwardly and adequately explained by the relative insensitivity of voters to 
cuts in public investment. The improving state of public finances in the nineties did, however, 
not resulted in a recovery of public investment as one could have expected. Indeed, the ex 
post forecast performance for the nineties and the first few years of the new millennium of 
regressions based on the budgetary consolidation view of public investment, is, most of the 
time, disappointing. This indicates that the consolidation view on public investment is, at 
least, incomplete. We propose to extend the budgetary consolidation approach to public 
1 See, for example, Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995), Berndt and Hansson (1991), Clark, Elsby and Love (2001), 
Conrad and Seitz (1994), Evans and Karras (1994), Ford and Poret (1991), Mehrotra and Välilä (2005), Sturm 
and De Haan (1995 and 1998) and Van Houdt, Mathä and Smid (2000).
2 See, for example, Gemmell (1993), Lybeck (1986) and Lybeck and Henrekson (1988).
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investment by a variable that captures the ‘history’ of past cuts in government consumption 
expenditures. The argument is simple: when cuts in public investment instead of in 
consumption expenditures limit the electoral damage of consolidations, increases in public
investments will not be the preferred choice of the incumbent policy makers once the 
consolidations are over. Instead, they will favour increases in government consumption 
expenditures because voters are more sensitive to these. The argument thus questions the 
existence of a memory-effect of budgetary consolidations. 
In order to test for a memory-effect, we assume that voters use a simple backward-looking 
rule for the evaluation of policy makers. More specific, they are believed to compare the 
current level of primary government consumption expenditures to the highest level 
experienced previously. This expenditure gap is a measure of past expenditure cuts and is 
assumed to reflect the discontent of voters with past and current budgetary policies. In order
to maximize their electoral support, policy makers will thus seek to reduce the expenditure 
gap. This evaluation idea which consists of a comparison between the highest level observed 
previously and the current level originated in psychological studies about how patients 
remembered painful medical examinations. It is known as the peak/end evaluation procedure. 
References can be found in texts on behavioural economics (see Kahneman, Wakker and 
Sarin, 1997 for references). As far as we could detect, the idea has not been used in applied 
macro-economic research. 
The connection between the expenditure gap and public investment extends the 
assumption that voters are much more sensitive to changes in primary public consumption 
than to adjustments in public investment. As a result, public investment will not only be cut in 
periods of budgetary stress but will not increase when additional budgetary means are 
available. This matches the budgetary experience of most countries over the past three 
decades since initially cuts in public investment were combined with reductions in current 
expenditures implying a large expenditure gap in the early nineties. In order to minimize the 
prevailing discontent of voters, policy makers preferred, whenever the budgetary possibilities 
were there, to increase primary government consumption expenditures rather than public 
investment. The hypothesis we test is thus whether the ‘memory effect’ of budgetary cuts can 
explain the sluggishness of public investment after 1990.
In section 2 we start with a summary of the evidence on the link between budgetary 
consolidations and public investment. In a next paragraph we report the econometric evidence 
on public investment. In order to test the existing approaches we also report the results of a 
small forecasting exercise for the post 1990-period. The poor forecasting record shows, at 
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least, that the evolution of public investment can not be explained by referring only to a 
mechanical link with the budgetary situation. In section 3 we formulate an alternative 
econometric specification. This approach is tested in section 4 on public investment data for 
15 Western European countries.
II. Fiscal consolidations and public investment
Introduction
Public investment declined over the past three decades3 in most Western European countries; 
noteworthy exceptions are the Mediterranean countries Greece, Portugal and Spain. Some 
informative statistics on public investment are reported in table 1. More precisely, we report 
the maximum value of the public investment to GDP ratio, the average value for the seventies 
and eighties and for the period 1991-2004. Except for France, the maximum value always 
exceeds 4 percent. This value was, most of the time, observed in the seventies. The average 
for the first sub-period, reported in the second column, is frequently substantially lower 
compared to the maximum value illustrating the decline in public investment duri ng the 
eighties. The decline continued in the second sub-period, except in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, three Mediterranean countries that joined the European Union in the eighties and could 
benefit from important foreign grants. Note that the drop in the public investment ratio is not 
related to the privatisation operations that occurred over the past two decades since
investments by public enterprises are accounted as private investment in the national 
accounts4.
Following the pioneering studies by Aschauer (1989a and 1989b) on the productivity of 
public investment , various researchers studied the consequences of a smaller stock of public 
capital on economic growth (see, for example, Sturm, 1998, Sturm, 2001, International 
Monetary Fund, 2004, Romp and De Haan, 2005 and Kamps, 2004 and 2005). Surprisingly, 
only a few studies focus on the determinants of the decline in public investment . The existing 
studies are, most of the time, inspired by studies on fiscal consolidations. The parallelism in 
most countries during the eighties between declining budget deficits and the smaller share of 
public investment in GDP is indeed striking. This relationship was first observed by Roubini 
and Sachs (1989, p. 108-109). These authors argued that during fiscal consolidations ‘capital 
3 See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2004), Välilä, Kozluk and Mehrotra (2005) or Perée and Välilä 
(2005) for a general discussion of the evolution of public investment in different countries.
4 Välilä, Kozluk and Mehrotra (2005), p. 26.
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expenditures are the first to be reduced (often drastically)’. Their explanation was that ‘they 
are the least rigid component of expenditures’. Many studies elaborated on this result (see 
Giudice, Turrini and in ‘t Veld, 2003 for a list).
More recent research considered the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact on public investment. Gali and Perotti (2003), for example, find that the Pact did 
not affect public investment. They argue that the decline in this component of government 
spending started earlier and that the decline in non-emu countries was even larger.
The main conclusion of this research is that public investment suffered from the fiscal 
consolidations that many, if not all, countries had to impose sometime over the past decades. 
Econometric research followed this line of argument by incorporating variables that capture 
the financial stress situation of governments (especially the debt and deficit).
[Here table 1]
Econometric evidence on public investment5
All in all, not that many authors have attempted to estimate econometric relationships for 
public investment . Early studies were initiated by Lybeck and Henrekson (1988). They
concern public investment in France (Aubin, Berdot, Goyeau and Lafay, 1988), Sweden 
(Henrekson, 1988), Germany (Kirchgässner and Pommerehne, 1988) and Norway (Sorensen, 
1988). Note that the regressions were not developed to explain specifically public investment 
but also government consumption, transfers etc. The specifications capture the then prevailing
theories about the growth of government expenditures6. Although the specifications differ
between countries, a general pattern emerges. First of all, variables are introduced to reflect 
the general economic condition. It concerns real GDP growth , the unemployment rate, the 
inflation rate, relative prices etc. The state of the financial position of the government is 
captured by the government deficit or the public debt. In addition, specific demand variables 
such as the degree of urbanization, the labour force participation rate and some demographic 
indicators are important too. Finally, in all regressions at least one political variable appears. 
5
 See De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) for a tabular presentation of the econometric studies that were available 
in the mid 1990’s. See also Lybeck (1986) and Gemmell (1993) for surveys of the theories of the growth of the 
government. 
6
 See Lybeck (1988), chapter 3 for explanations about how the studies relate to the theories explaining the 
growth of governments. 
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They relate to elections, the ideology of the government or the type of government (majority, 
coalition etc.).
The results are rather conflicting as is illustrated by two citations. Henrekson (1988, p. 
123) notes that ‘the theories expounded in the government growth literature are not wholly 
suited to explaining government investment alone’. Aubin, Berdot, Goyeau and Lafay (1988, 
p. 223) observe that ‘compared with other types of expenditure, public investment is less 
demand-determined’.
Van Dalen and Swank (1996) report evidence that spending on infrastructure in the 
Netherlands was higher under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments. De 
Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996)7 use a panel data set of OECD countries. The dependent 
variable is either the share of government investment in GDP or in total government 
expenditures. The most interesting results show that public investment can be explained by 
the lagged dependent variable, the differential between changes in the price index of 
government expenditures and GDP, a fiscal stringency variable (equal to one when the 
structural deficit is reduced by at least 1 percent of GDP) and by private investment (these are 
complementary with public investments). Do note that several political variables were tested 
but did not produced significant coefficients.
Sturm and De Haan (1998)8 apply the Granger causality test to Dutch public investments. 
For our use it suffices to report that they do not find any causality running from the deficit, the 
debt or interest payments to public investment; population growth, however, causes public 
investment. One should take into account that the sample ends in 1984, i.e., before the start of 
some important fiscal consolidations.
Sturm (2001) tests three hypotheses about public investment on a panel of 123 non-OECD 
countries. A first one explains public investment by structural variables, i.e., by the degree of 
urbanization and population growth (Wagner’s law). A second hypothesis is captured by
economic-financial variables. It concerns variables such as economic growth, the budget 
deficit, government debt, interest payment on this debt, private and foreign aid, the degree of 
openness and foreign direct investment. A last hypothesis implies politico-institutional
variables. These reflect the ideology of the executive, electoral cycles, the presence of 
coalition governments, the degree of economic and political freedom and the degree of
political instability. Of interest to us is that the relationship between public investment and 
public deficits is time-dependent: higher current deficits stimulate investments but larger past 
7 See also Sturm (1998), chapter 3.
8
 See also or Sturm (1998), chapter 2.
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7
deficits decrease them. This result also holds for public debt. Finally, politico-institutional 
variables were not associated with significant coefficients. 
Turrini (2004) derives his regression from a two stage optimization process. In a first 
stage the optimal value for the cyclically adjusted deficit is determined so as to minimize a 
quadratic loss function in the output gap, the deviation of debt from a target level and the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit. In the second stage, public investment is 
determined so as to minimize the difference with an ‘efficiency-maximising investment level’ 
and the deviation of total government expenditures from a target level. One interesting feature 
of this approach is the attention paid to the budgetary inertia: important changes in the deficit 
and primary expenditures are penalized. 
The estimation results for a panel data set of 14 EU-countries for the period 1970-2002 
indicate that public investment is especially sensitive to lagged real output per head, much 
less to the output gap. The coefficients of the debt and the cyclically adjusted primary deficit 
are significantly negative, sustaining the expectation that the decline in public investment is 
related to a worsening of the budgetary situation. Restricting the sample to the post-1993 
period for EMU-countries increases the effect of the debt level. This result is confirmed by 
the regression results of a model that contains post-1993 dummies. Turrini concludes that 
efficiency and not stabilisation motives characterise public investment. Furthermore, 
budgetary consolidations have influenced public investment indirectly through the behaviour 
of fiscal authorities. More specifically, the weights attached to the goals in the loss functions 
were affected by the EMU-consolidations.
Perée and Välilä (2005) explain public investment by traditional (lagged) variables such 
as real GDP, interest rates, the deficit and the debt level and by an EMU-dummy (equal to one 
starting in 1993). In addition, the deficit is disaggregated into revenues and expenditures. The 
model is estimated for a panel of 10 EU-members; a re-estimation for four cohesion countries 
serves as a test. The results are satisfactory: all variables except the EMU-dummy differ 
significantly from zero. The positive coefficient of real GDP indicates that public investment 
can be considered a ‘luxury commodity’. Whereas the debt and deficit levels have the 
expected negative sign, the positive sign of the interest rate is difficult to explain when it 
serves as a proxy for interest charges.
Perée and Välilä (2005) expand their model with the lagged dependent variable and a time 
trend. This regression is estimated for ten EU-member countries9. Striking is that, looking at 
9
 In Perée and Välilä (2005) only the regression results with significant coefficients are given; Mehrotra and 
Välilä (2005) report the complete results.
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8
the results as a whole, the negative time trend appears to be the single most important 
variable: the trend is present in all equations and differs significantly from zero in 8 out of 10 
regressions; the debt level is significant in 5 regressions. In Mehrotra and Välilä (2005) the 
previous results are further sustained by a cointegration analysis. All in all, the estimated 
regressions in both studies catch rather well the downward trend in the series. However, only 
one variable, the debt level, provides an economic explanation for this evolution.
In summary, most if not all existing studies explain the decline in public investment by 
traditional indicators of the stance of public finances, i.e., the public deficit and the public 
debt. A few authors do add dummy variables to capture situations of financial crises (for 
example, De Haan, Sturm and Sikken, 1996) or to impose regime shifts in the regressions 
(Turrini, 2004). Note also that several authors introduce political variables but the results are 
mixed. 
The forecasting record of the relationship between public investment and public finance 
variables
The conclusion about a direct relationship between the decline in public investment and the 
budgetary consolidations seems, theoretically and econometrically, quite convincing and 
robust. However, a closer look does reveal some important problems.
A first problem is that the sample period of most studies, beginning somewhere in the 
seventies and ending in the mid-nineties or around 2000, is not really homogenous as to the 
stance of public finances. Although many European countries struggled to meet the public 
finance criteria of the Maastricht Treaty in the nineties, the threat of financial crises due to 
unsustainable budgetary policies was much bigger in the eighties. So the financial constraint 
on budgetary policies was relatively looser in the nineties compared to the eighties. This was, 
partly, the result of the reduction in interest payments and the widespread increase in taxes.
If the evolution of the deficit is used as a rough guide for the link between public 
investment and fiscal consolidations, one would expect some recovery of public investment in 
the nineties from the trough in the eighties. The deficit indeed improved spectacularly in all 
European countries and appears, in one form or another, in most regressions explaining public 
investment. However, in general, public investment did not show any rebound  at all, on the 
contrary. 
The experience of the nineties must thus shed some doubt on the simple relationship 
between the budgetary situation, expressed by variables as the government debt and the 
Page 8 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
9
deficit, and the evolution of public investment. We explore this further in table 2. We first 
estimate simple regressions that explain public investment over the pre-1990 period; all data 
are expressed as a percentage of GDP. The explanatory variables are reported in the second 
column and are compatible with the existing studies on the relationship between public 
investment and budgetary consolidations. Notice that due to missing data, we could not 
estimate regressions for Finland, Portugal and Spain, and that probably better specifications 
could have been found if a thorough econometric analysis would have been made.
Notwithstanding this, most of the regressions are quite satisfactory with coefficients of 
determination exceeding 0.9. The explanatory variables tested and eventually retained were: 
the total and the primary deficit, the total and primary cyclically corrected deficit, interest 
payments and the government debt. 
The third and fourth column report on the forecasting performance of the estimated 
regressions. It concerns a dynamic forecasting exercise whereby the lagged endogenous 
variable is the past forecast. Two summary indicators of the quality of the forecasts are 
reported: the root mean square error and the forecast error for the last year of the sample 
period, i.e., 2004. The striking feature of the forecasts is that most 2004-errors are negative 
indicating a general over-prediction. The size of the errors is frequently quite important, 
amounting sometimes to one half of the 1991-2004 average of public investment. Also note 
that no direct relationship appears to exist between the quality of the regression and its 
forecasting performance. 
The preceding short forecasting analysis at least indicates that the traditional specification 
of public investment regressions is deficient. Indeed, the improvements in the budgetary 
finances in the nineties leads to the forecast that public investment would recover somewhat 
but the data do not support this view. On the contrary, the downward trend of the eighties 
continued, in most countries, during the nineties. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this forecasting exercise is not to discard the budgetary 
approach that proved to be appropriate to explain the decline in public investment in the 
seventies and eighties. However, we would stress that this theory should be supplemented by 
an approach that explains why public investment did not recover in the nineties. One obvious 
explanation, the European Monetary integration phenomenon (the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact) can already be rejected since in the regressions we report later, 
dummy variables that capture these events do not appear systematically. One should thus look 
for another explanation. 
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[Here Table 2]
III. Explaining public investment
Public investment and budgetary variables: is there symmetry?
Although the forecasting record of the regressions that explain public investment by
budgetary variables is rather poor, this does not necessarily imply a rejection of the 
underlying theory, i.e., the link between public investment and the financial situation of the 
government. Eventually, the econometric translation of the theory could be inaccurate and/or 
incomplete. 
We acknowledge the explanations advanced for the link between public investment and 
budgetary consolidations. Besides the technical budgetary argument mentioned before, i.e., 
the ease to reduce public investment, authors refer to electoral arguments: public investment 
is a less visible type of expenditure so, less political resistance exists when they are cut back 
(see, for example, Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Oxley and Martin, 1991; De Haan, Sturm and 
Sikken, 1996 and Sturm 1998). In a nutshell: cutting public investment is perceived as less 
electorally punitive compared to reducing government consumption expenditures. The 
minimization of electoral damage is thus seen as, at least, a constraint on budgetary 
consolidation programs. Note that this assumes that voters are short-sighted. Indeed, when 
voters are assumed to prefer cuts in public investment to reductions in consumption 
expenditures, they neglect the long run effects of cuts in public investment, i.e., the impact on 
the structural growth potential of the economy. Furthermore, voters are also assumed to 
ignore that by limiting cuts in government consumption expenditures, budgetary 
consolidations will tend to be less successful10. As a result, it becomes more probable that in 
the future new budgetary consolidations will have to be imposed. 
Accepting that the composition of budgetary consolidations is influenced by electoral 
concerns is not without further consequences. Indeed, electoral aspects will then also affect 
the allocation of budgetary resources when the financial position of the government improves. 
In the regression specifications, improvements in budgetary variables will, neglecting the 
sign, have a similar impact as deteriorations. A careful interpretation of the ‘election’-
approach to the composition of budgetary consolidations does, however, not lead to the 
prediction of a recovery of public investment when budgetary resources improve. Indeed, if it 
10 See summary table in Giudice, Turrini and in ‘t Veld (2003), p. 7.
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is electorally less punitive to cut public investment when budgetary consolidations need to be 
imposed, one expects, ceteris paribus, that it will be less rewarding to increase these
expenditures when budgetary variables improve. Phrased differently, when consumption 
expenditures are spared in budgetary stress situations, they will also be favoured afterwards.
The election approach thus holds that public investment will decline when budgetary 
consolidations are imposed and remain relatively stable when government finances improve. 
The effect of budgetary variables on public investment is thus not symmetric. At least 
additional variables that capture more directly the electoral consequences of budgetary 
choices should be considered.
The election motive of policy makers is thus not only able to explain the decline in public 
investment in the seventies and eighties but also the continuous slack in public investment in 
the nineties. The important empirical implication is that the bad forecast record is not due to 
an inappropriate theory, but to an unfortunate empirical formulation of that theory. The 
formulation indeed assumes that the budgetary variables do capture the sentiment of voters. 
This is acceptable whenever these variables deteriorate, not when they improve. 
Do past cuts in government consumption matter?
The conclusion that the traditional specifications of the public investment regressions are 
inappropriate because of the symmetry they imply with respect to the effects of budgetary
variables does not lead straightforwardly to a more appropriate specification. However, a 
second aspect of these traditional regressions is more helpful. This feature relates to the
implicitly assumed rationality of voters. If voters are perfectly informed and rational, they will 
not be misled by deficit spending and therefore by the timing of taxation. Voters will then be 
forward looking and thus only be interested in knowing whether government finances are on a 
sustainable path, i.e., whether current and future taxes match current and future expenditures 
and the outstanding stock of debt. Reductions in government expenditures compensated by 
smaller deficits will thus not, in general, affect voters since they know that there is an 
offsetting effect operating through total taxes. Rationality thus implies that the ‘road’ to 
sustainable government finances, the ‘content’ of the budgetary consolidation, is completely 
irrelevant. Furthermore, voters will have no specific preference for cuts in public investment 
or in government consumption expenditures since they will consider the longer run benefits of 
investments by the government. 
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The evidence discussed previously, however, indicates that policy makers do modulate the 
composition of the budgetary consolidations so as to limit the electoral damage. The 
mainstream explanation for the decline in public investment holds that voters are less 
sensitive to cuts in public investment compared to cuts in government consumption 
expenditures. Obviously, this not only reflects the hypothesis that voters are myopic since 
they overlook the longer run benefits of public investment but also that government 
consumption expenditures are the yardstick used by voters to evaluate the performance of the 
incumbent policy makers.
Notwithstanding the preference of policy makers for cuts in public investment over those 
in consumption expenditures, one must concede that in reality consumption expenditures had 
to bear the brunt of the budgetary consolidations. Indeed, in the early eighties public 
investment amounted, on average, to less than one tenth of total government expenditures. 
Any important budgetary consolidation operation required therefore large reductions in
government consumption expenditures. The resulting electoral damage for the incumbent 
policy makers is evident.
However, once elections have been called, it is, implicitly, assumed that the dissatisfaction 
of voters disappears completely. In no way do reductions in government consumption
expenditures that were imposed before these elections affect the policies devised by the new 
incumbent policy makers: these policy makers are assumed to start with a blank sheet. This 
contradicts the assumption that the level of government consumption expenditures is 
important to voters. In order to remedy this incoherence, we need to stipulate that, at any time, 
the evaluation of incumbent policy makers not only depends on the current level of these 
expenditures but also on all previous cuts in these expenditures. New incumbents will thus be 
evaluated negatively as long as all previous cuts in government consumption expenditures are 
not reversed. The resulting electoral pressure will then force these policy makers to offset, if
budgetary resources are available, previous expenditure reductions11. The impact of previous 
cuts in government consumption expenditures is defined as the ‘memory-effect’. 
The preceding discussion implies that the rationality of voters is a necessary assumption 
for consolidation processes to be successful since rational voters will look forward and thus 
evaluate budgetary consolidations as to their effect on the sustainability of public finances. 
Cuts in government consumption will then not receive any special attention. If, however, 
11 One can link this view to the behavioural finance result that holds that investors will keep their stocks until 
previous losses are offset. This effect is known as the disposition-effect; investor are then said to suffer from 
‘get-evenitis’ (see Shrefrin, 2000, chapter 9). 
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voters care about the level of government consumption, incumbent policy makers will be 
under electoral pressure to reverse previous cuts in government consumption expenditures. 
Admittedly, this amounts to a replication of preceding budgetary errors but since politics is 
about being and staying an incumbent policy maker, popularity scores do matter. Successful 
consolidations are not only devised by policy makers who can resist the pressure to reverse 
expenditure cuts to increase their popularity but require also the ensuing generations of policy 
makers to possess this quality. Incumbent policy makers who are unable to defy the
temptation to increase their popularity by raising consumption expenditures will have 
managed an unsuccessful consolidation process or will have disrupted an up to then 
successful consolidation. 
The introduction of a ‘memory-effect’ linked to past levels of government consumption 
expenditures has important implications for the specification of regressions covering 
budgetary as well as post post-budgetary consolidation periods. The traditional specification 
of public investment regressions reflects only the view prevalent in budgetary consolidation 
periods that voters sanction incumbent policy makers because they assimilate cuts in 
consumption government expenditures with incompetence and thus vote for rivals in the 
subsequent elections. At the end of budgetary consolidations, the discontent of voters is 
assumed to disappear so any improvement in the budgetary situation leads one to expect that 
public investment will increase. As illustrated, this specification is not able to explain the 
stagnation of public investment in the post-consolidation period. Our solution to this problem 
is to abandon the assumption of rational voters and to introduce previous cuts in government
consumption expenditures so as to capture the latent discontent of voters.
Summarizing, our assumption about the behaviour of voters extends the traditional view 
expressed in public investment regressions that incumbent policy makers care for their re-
election and thus will, during a consolidation process, aim to minimize the discontent of 
voters by reducing relatively more public investment. When the budgetary stress alleviates, 
voters will confront policy makers with the accumulated expenditure cuts and aim for a 
reversal of these cuts. As a result, public investment will be penalized not only during a 
budgetary consolidation operation but also afterwards. Taken at face value, this approach 
predicts that the outlook for public investment will remain bleak as long as the level of 
government consumption expenditures has not been restored to the pre-consolidation level. 
Note that the exposed link between past and current budgetary policies does exist in the 
theory of the growth of the government. For example, ‘the displacement effect’ developed by 
Peacock and Wiseman (1967), holds that people accept higher taxes imposed during war 
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times to finance military expenditures. Once the war is over, military expenditures are 
replaced by other expenditures since the public is used to the higher taxes and expenditures. 
This theory thus implies an acceptance of high levels of taxation and expenditures because 
they become reference or anchor values. The rise in taxes as a result of the growth in welfare 
expenditures induced by the crisis of the mid-seventies can be interpreted similarly as the war 
experience. Do note that the similarities are limited since the post-war switch from military to 
other expenditures differs from what occurred in the second half of the seventies. 
Measuring voters’ dissatisfaction 
Whether discontent voters exert pressure to revert the consolidation process can be tested if 
the dissatisfaction of voters can be adequately formulated and quantified. We propose a 
simple indicator of the dissatisfaction of voters that is based on two elements of behavioural 
economics. First, we suppose that voters evaluate current incumbent policy makers using
government consumption expenditures and separate these expenditures from their other 
financial operations. This can be rationalized by referring to a mental accounting process: 
consumption expenditures capture directly visible expenditures such as compensation of 
employees and transfers that differ from other income sources. Second, voters use a simple 
evaluation technique, more precisely, the peak/end evaluation procedure. This is the most 
vital assumption we make. We base this procedure on studies of how individuals evaluate 
pain. Several experiments (see, for example, Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997 and 
Kahneman, 2003 for references) indicate that people evaluate pain by referring to the highest 
disutility and the one recorded at the end of the experience. All other information, including 
the duration of the experiment, is neglected. For obvious reasons this effect is also known as 
the ‘memory bias’. This peak/end reference framework can be easily transposed to budgetary 
consolidations and interpreted as a measure of the discontent of voters. This discontent 
measure can be evaluated in a regression explaining public investment. Note that any test will 
be a combined test of the quantification of the attitude of voters and the particular hypothesis
that stipulates an effect for this attitude. A negative outcome could thus indicate that the 
variable capturing the attitude of voters was inappropriate and/or that the assumption about its 
impact is wrong. 
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The anchor, ‘the peak’, is defined as the maximum ratio of primary government 
consumption expenditures to GDP observed previously12. We stress that public investment  are 
excluded13. Since we consider primary expenditures, interest payments are also excluded. 
These payments to debt holders are indeed quite different from, for example, transfers. We 
thus define the expenditure gap as the difference between the anchor and the current primary 
government consumption expenditure ratio. 
The memory-effect of budgetary consolidations holds that positive expenditure gaps 
results from cuts in primary government consumption expenditures and measure the 
discontent of voters associated with these budgetary cuts. Incumbent policy makers will then 
strive to lower this discontent by reversing the cuts in government consumption expenditures. 
When budgetary resources are limited, the reversing process can take a long time. One can not 
exclude that the memory-effect also operates when government consumption expenditures 
rise. In that case, the effect will dampen the increase in expenditures. It is also an empirical 
matter whether voters consider the evolution of taxes. For this reason we distinguish between 
the gross and the net expenditure gap.
The gross expenditure gap is defined as:
GGgapt = Gmaxt - Gt where Gmax is max {Gt-1, …} [1]
where GGgap is the gross expenditure gap as a percentage of GDP, Gmax is the maximal 
value for primary government consumption expenditures as a percentage of GDP observed 
previously and G are the observed primary government consumption expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. In order to test for non-linearities we replaced the negative values in the 
expenditure gap variable by zeros; this is the GGgapZt variable. Note that both expenditure 
gaps express the assumption that the highest observed values are the central reference values 
that guide voters14.
Budgetary consolidations will increase the expenditure gaps whenever primary 
consumption government expenditures are reduced to either lower the deficit, finance lower 
taxes or pay for rising interest payments on the government debt. In general, the expenditure 
gaps will rise as the budgetary consolidations proceed. The regressions will test what effect, if 
12 Note that anchoring is also an element of behavioural decision making.
13
 For expository reasons we will not systematically repeat that the primary consumption expenditures 
considered exclude public investment. This budgetary item is eliminated so as to avoid spurious correlation 
when the expenditure gaps are introduced as explanatory variables in public investment regressions. 
14
 This is an approximation to the well known utility function in behavioural finance that expresses prospect 
theory whereby the part that reflects the utility associated with gains is replaced by the abscissa. 
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any, this exert on the evolution of public investment and thus, indirectly, on the consolidation 
process. Furthermore, at the end of the consolidation process, the expenditure gap will, most 
likely, be positive and so we are able to test whether the dissatisfaction of voters, 
approximated by this gap, still affects public investment. The assumption being tested is that 
voters will be discontent as long as government consumption expenditures have not recovered 
to their previous maximal value. Meanwhile public investment will be affected negatively.
The gross expenditure gap excludes taxes so cuts in expenditures that are matched by cuts 
in taxes increase the gross expenditure gap. The net expenditure gap incorporates the change 
in total taxes over the period that covers the expenditure gap. More precisely:
NGgapt = GGgapt – [TGmax – Tt] [2]
where NGgap is the net government expenditure gap, and TGmax is the tax to GDP ratio in the 
year of Gmax and T is the tax ratio. In NGgapZt, the net government expenditure gap,
negative values of NGgapt are replaced by zero. Note that the net expenditure gap exceeds the 
gross expenditures gap whenever taxes increased compared to the year the maximal value of 
expenditures was observed. 
Whether the gross or the net expenditure gap is the most appropriate variable to capture 
the dissatisfaction of voters depends on their tax awareness. If voters suffer from an important 
degree of fiscal illusion, they will only consider changes in primary government consumption 
expenditures. So the regressions also offer some evidence on the existence of that illusion.
Table 3 reports some general information on the gross and net expenditure gaps. The gross 
gaps, with the exception of Greece and Portugal, still show a positive value in 2004, the final 
year of the sample period. This implies that the level of primary consumption expenditures is 
still below the maximum level observed over the previous three decades. Especially the 
maximum value for the gross expenditure gap reveals the expenditure cuts that have been 
imposed during budgetary consolidations. Values above 10 percent are observed for Finland, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The difference between the maximum value and 
the value observed in 2004 indicates to what extent policy makers were successful to resist the 
pressure to compensate for the past expenditure cuts. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden belong to the group of successful countries, i.e., to the group of 
countries where the 2004-value for the expenditure gaps is comparable to the maximum 
value.
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[Here Table 3]
The net expenditure gap includes the change in the tax ratio. A higher tax ratio increases
the discontent of voters. Most of the time budgetary consolidations incorporate tax increases
as well as expenditure cuts but this does not systematically imply that the net expenditure gap 
exceeds the gross gap because of timing differences. This is the case for Germany and 
Norway. In only three countries, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, were taxes 
reduced and expenditures cut simultaneously, alleviating the discontent of voters. Finally, we 
note that the gross as well as the net expenditure gap indicates that, if our interpretation is 
correct, the discontent by voters is, in general, still important at the end of the sample period. 
Indeed, the net expenditure gap exceeds 5 percent of GDP in 10 out of the 15 countries of our 
sample. The exceptions are: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.
IV. Regression results
The specification of the public investment regressions resembles, partly, other research on 
public investment. Indeed, one can not discard that in most countries the downward slide of 
public investment started when developments in public finances appeared to be unsustainable. 
We capture this process by including budgetary indicators that also appear in previous studies 
on public investment. It concerns variables such as interest payments, the total deficit, the 
primary deficit and the debt. These variables function as the catalyst of the consolidation 
process. A second group of variables, the cyclically adjusted total and primary deficit, reflects 
the stabilization goal that the governments, eventually, could pursue.
Our innovation consists in introducing the expenditure gap variables. These are supposed 
to reflect the discontent of voters with the previously experienced budgetary consolidations 
and so to exert pressure on the incumbent policy makers to offset the cuts in primary 
government consumption expenditures. As a result, public investment will not rise once 
additional budgetary resources turn out to be available at the end of consolidations. We expect 
the expenditure gaps to have a negative sign since the offsetting of previous cuts in primary 
government consumption depresses public investment. 
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The sample consists of 14 member countries of the European Union (not Luxembourg and 
the new member-countries) plus Norway. The sample starts most of the time in 1972 and ends
in 2004. Table 4 reports the results.
The statistical quality of the results for most countries is very satisfactory. For two 
countries no acceptable results were obtained. We could have deleted these cases but feel that 
negative results also contain useful information. Note that it concerns Greece and Spain, two 
countries that joined the European Union only in the eighties (Greece in 1981 and Spain in 
1986). Since both countries received important European grants, this could ‘disturb’ the 
estimation results. Indeed, the data in table 1 illustrate that, on average, public investment 
increased only considerably in Greece and Spain after 1990. Note that the regression for 
Portugal, a country that joined the European Union together with Spain and also benefited 
from money flows from the regional funds, is, although acceptable, the poorest of the group. 
Finally, we recall that the regression for Greece in table 2 was already quite poor.
[Here Table 4]
Supporting evidence for our assumption about the impact of the expenditure gaps on 
public investment is that the regressions perform quite well for those countries that 
experienced a sharp drop in public expenditures and are less convincing for countries where 
public investment declined only moderately. The only exception is the United Kingdom 
where the drop in public investment is quite pronounced but the regression result is relatively 
average.
The expenditure gaps explain quite well the evolution of public investment in most 
countries. The size of the coefficients could appear to be small (about 0.03 when the lagged 
dependent variable is present) but note that the expenditure gap amounts to, eventualy  5 or 10
percent, so a short run impact of 0.15 or 0.30 percent of GDP is not uncommon. Since the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable equals about 0.5, the longer run effects are about 
twice as high as the short run ones. Compared to the decline in public investment as reported 
in table 1, we conclude that the results indicate that the expenditure gaps are able to explain a 
large fraction, one third to one half, of the decline in public investment. Recall that the results 
sustain the assumption that the negative impact of previous cuts in primary government 
consumption on public investment will last as long the expenditure gap is positive, i.e., as 
long as accumulated reductions in government consumption has not been reversed.
Page 18 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
19
The expenditures gaps that appear in most regressions are those defined in expressions [1] 
and [2], i.e., the series contain negative as well as positive values. This indicates that when the 
public consumption ratio tends to rise beyond its previous maximum value, more budgetary 
resources will also be allocated to public investment. We recall that this indicates that voters 
use the maximum observed government consumption expenditure ratio as a reference point: 
additional government expenditures are not appreciated as much as is the case when the 
expenditure gaps are negative. As a result, policy makers also increase public investment. 
Concerning the relevancy of the gross and net expenditure gap, we note that the net 
expenditure gap is present in only three regressions, the one for Denmark, France and 
Portugal. Two of these regressions, for France and Portugal, are not particularly good but we 
do not know the relevance of this. Formulated differently, in most countries the gross 
expenditure gap seems to be an acceptable indicator of the dissatisfaction of voters; voters 
neglect changes, in general, changes in taxation.
The traditional explanatory variables in regressions that explain public investment are also 
present in the regressions presented in table 4. It concerns variables that capture the situation 
of public finances such as the deficit, the debt and interest payments. The sign of the debt and 
interest payments is unambiguously negative. This is not so for the primary deficit. Indeed, a 
higher deficit, defined as taxes less expenditures, could lead to lower public investment 
because the deficit signals budgetary stress; on the other hand, a higher deficit also indicates a 
weaker economy so the stabilization goal of the government points towards more public 
investment. The results do indicate that in Austria and Belgium the second interpretation 
holds; however, the size of the coefficient is quite small. In Denmark the financial 
interpretation is supported by the data.
The lagged dependent variable is frequently an explanatory variable. This indicates some 
sluggishness in public investment. Note that we also tested for a negative effect of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The Maastricht Treaty stipulated the 
monetary union entry conditions. They required a deficit of less than 3 percent of GDP and a 
debt ratio of less than 60 percent of GDP in 1997. The main policy implication was that most 
countries aiming for accession had to reduce their deficit. Maybe surprising, the Maastricht 
dummy proved only to have an impact on public investment in two countries that did not join 
the monetary union, i.e., Denmark and the United Kingdom. This not only indicates that the 
Maastricht-criteria were probably redundant: budgetary consolidations were necessary even 
without the prospect of joining the monetary union. The criteria that the Stability and Growth 
Pact contain for public finances only affected public investment in Austria.
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V. Conclusions
Public investment is frequently viewed as an important determinant of the structural rate of 
growth of an economy. In most countries public investment declined significantly over the 
past decades, certainly if we compare actual levels to the maximum values observed in the 
seventies or early eighties. This was a period of high but unsustainable public deficits. The 
subsequent budgetary consolidations reduced all government spending but, proportionally, 
public investment was especially hard hit: the current public investment to GDP ratio is in 
many countries less than one half of the maximum observed ratio. However, in some 
countries such as Finland and France the public investment ratio remained more or less stable. 
In a few countries, Greece, Ireland and Spain, we even observe an increase. 
The usual explanation for the decline in public spending refers to the budgetary 
consolidations. This is especially convincing to explain the evolution of public investment in 
the eighties. This approach is, however, not really able to explain why public investment did 
not recover somewhat during the nineties when the budgetary stress was, in general, lower 
compared to the eighties. We sustain this view by a small forecasting exercise.
We do not challenge the budgetary consolidation view but supplement it with a memory-
effect related to government consumption expenditures. Rational voters do not look back and 
do not react to cuts in consumption spending of the government during a consolidation 
process. We argue that voters evaluate incumbent policy makers by comparing the current 
primary government consumption expenditure ratio to the highest value observed in the past. 
This peak/end evaluation procedure, a behavioural economics idea, allows a simple 
quantification of the accumulated discontent of voters related to continuous budgetary 
consolidations. The tested assumption is that voters pressure incumbent policy makers to 
reduce this expenditure gap. 
Regressions for the main member countries of the European Union support this view. The 
results do indicate that in most countries, even when budgetary policy is on a sustainable 
course, public investment will not recover since it is electorally more rewarding for policy 
makers to increase government consumption expenditures rather than public investment. This 
view thus introduces a link between past budgetary consolidations and current policies. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of public investments, 1972-2004, in percent of GDP. 
Maximum value
(year)
Average:
1972-1990
Average:
1991-2004
Austria 5.44 (1972) 4.1 2.1
Belgium 4.58 (1981) 3.6 1.7
Denmark 4.05 (1972) 2.8 1.8
Finland 3.97 (1975) 3.6 3.0
France 3.75 (1975) 3.2 3.2
Germany 4.40 (1974) 3.3 2.0
Greece 4.21 (2004) 2.8 3.2
Ireland 4.64 (1974) 3.5 2.9
Italy 3.57 (1981) 3.2 2.5
Netherlands 4.41 (1972) 3.4 3.0
Norway 7.89 (1978) 4.0 3.2
Portugal 4.84 (1981) 3.6* 3.7
Spain 5.13 (1990) 3.0 3.7
Sweden 7.06 (1972) 4.8 3.4
UK 5.25 (1974) 3.0 1.8
Notes * : starting 1977.
Source: OECD
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Table 2: Forecasting exercise: regressions up 1990 and forecasts statistics 1991-2004. 
Regression up to 1990 Forecasts 1991-2004
Explanatory variables (1) Coeff. of determin. RMSE (2) Error 2004
Austria D, PI(-1) 0.95 0.79 -1.37
Belgium Pridef, PI(-1) 0.96 0.61 -1.41
Denmark IP, PI(-1) 0.92 0.63 -0.90
Finland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
France D, PI(-1) 0.61 0.34 -0.51
Germany D, Pridef 0.96 0.39 0.30
Greece Pridef, PI(-1) 0.44 1.41 1.71
Ireland IP, PI(-1) 0.79 0.57 -1.46
Italy Defco, PI(-1) 0.66 0.19 0.28
Netherlands D, PI(-1) 0.89 0.20 -0.36
Norway Pridef, PI(-1) 0.80 0.68 -0.09
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden D, Pridef, PI(-1) 0.97 0.35 -0.54
UK Pridefco, PI(-1) 0.91 1.60 -1.59
Notes n.a.: indicates that too many observations where missing so that the pre-1990 regression could not be 
estimated.
(1): D: debt, Defco: total deficit cyclically corrected, IP: interest payments, PI(-1): lagged public 
investment, Pridef: primary deficit, Pridefco: primary deficit cyclically corrected.
(2): Root mean square error.
Source: OECD.
All data expressed as a percentage of GDP.
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Table 3: Summary information on the gross and net expenditure gaps, in percentage of GDP,
              1972-2004.
Gross expenditure gap Net expenditure gap
Maximum value Value in 
2004
Maximum value Value in 
2004
Austria 3.25 (2004) 3.25 5.08 (2002) 4.62
Belgium 9.99 (1990) 6.76 10.91 (2000) 9.87
Denmark 9.73 (1986) 2.93 14.83 (1987) 8.97
Finland 15.93 (2000) 13.59 25.43 (2001) 20.47
France 2.98 (1984) 0.40 5.86 (2000) 2.45
Germany 5.41 (1989) 1.48 5.33 (2000) 0.44
Greece 4.15 (1994) -4.04 16.85 (2001) 7.91
Ireland 19.99 (2000) 17.24 12.41 (2000) 6.87
Italy 4.03 (2000) 0.92 13.63 (2000) 9.44
Netherlands 13.07 (2000) 9.08 7.28 (2000) 1.56
Norway 18.82 (2001) 14.34 13.27 (2000) 8.34
Portugal 2.23 (1988) -0.70 12.76 (2004) 12.76
Spain 7.10 (2001) 5.99 12.72 (2003) 11.65
Sweden 16.43 (2001) 15.25 18.28 (2001) 13.30
UK 9.39 (2000) 2.94 4.40 (2000) -2.80
Notes: The sample period is equal to the period mentioned in table 1; the gross and net 
expenditure gaps are defined in expression [1] and [2].
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Table 4: Regression results, 1972-2004.
R2 RC2 d/h
Austria PIt = 5.17 - 0.14 GGgapt - 0.11Pridefcot - 0.74IPt - 1.35DGS
(39.51) (-3.19)  (-2.20)  (-12.65) (-8.60)
0.96 0.96 1.70
Belgium PIt = 3.61 - 0.14GGgapt-1 - 0.14Pridefcot
(51.58) (-7.19)     (-6.37)  
0.95 0.95 1.59
Denmark PIt = 1.39 - 0.03NGgapt-1 + 0.03Pridef - 0.10IPt - 0.21DMa + 0.57PIt-1 
(3.36)  (-1.98)        (2.39)       (-3.10)   (-1.92)     (4.75)
0.95 0.94 -0.69
Finland PIt = 3.76 - 0.02GGgapZt - 0.01Dt
(62.87)  (-4.28)  (-5.81)
0.86 0.85 1.98
France PIt = 1.66 - 0.03NGgapt + 0.50PIt-1 
(3.04)  (-1.97)        (2.94)
0.68 0.64 1.71*
Germany PIt = 3.09 - 0.04GGgapt - 0.03Dt + 0.40PIt-1 
(5.74)  (-2.70)   (-5.88)    (3.84)
0.98 0.98 1.24
Greece No results
Ireland PIt = 2.33 - 0.03GGgapt - 0.01Dt + 0.71PIt-1 
(3.95)  (-2.62)     (-4.26)      (8.08)
0.92 0.91 2.27
Italy PIt = 1.71 - 0.09GGgapt + 0.04(TGmax - Tt) + 0.48PIt-1 
    (3.92)  (-2.19)   (2.63)        (3.58)
0.82 0.80 0.50
Netherlands PIt = 4.15 - 0.03GGgapZt - 0.25IPt
(33.49)  (-4.77)   (-8.37)
0.79 0.77 1.47
Norway PIt = 0.91 - 0.03GGgapt + 0.75PIt-1 
(2.41)  (-2.19) (7.63)    
0.80 0.78 1.90
Portugal PIt = 2.86 - 0.04NGgapt-1 - 0.08IPt + 0.39PIt-1 
(9.22)  (-2.37)          (-2.78)      (5.06)  
0.58 0.53 1.44
Spain No results
Sweden PIt = 1.12 - 0.02GGgapt - 0.09IPt + 0.73PIt-1 
(4.67) (-2.17)   (-2.07)  (14.06)
0.96 0.95 0.94
UK PIt = 5.15 -0.19GGgapt - 0.61IPt -1.01DMa
 (8.35)   (-4.44) (-2.99)    (-3.41)
0.69 0.66 0.62
The sample period starts in 1972 except for Finland (1976), Ireland (1978), the Netherlands (1980), Norway (1975), Portugal 
(1977) and Spain (1979).
Notes: where D: debt ratio, Def: total deficit, DMa: Maastricht dummy variable, equal to 1 starting in 1993, DGS: Growth and 
Stability Pact dummy, equal to 1 starting in 1998, IP: interest payments to GDP ratio, PI: ratio of public investment to GDP, 
Pridefco: primary deficit cyclically corrected as a ratio of GDP, (TGmax – Tt): tax ratio in year of maximum primary consumption 
expenditures, excluding public investment less current tax ratio.
R2: coefficient of determination, RC2: this coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom, d/h: the Durbin-Watson or Durbin h 
autocorrelation statistics. * indicates that an adjustment for autocorrelation has been performed.
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